ប្រវត្តិសាស្រ្តបិទមុខ

During the decade that the United States fought in Vietnam, Cambodia was a sanctuary for the Communist forces of North Vietnam and a transportation hub that brought weapons, ammunition and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In addition to using the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia as a transportation system, the North Vietnamese built a series of bases called binh trams. These bases were used as early as 1962 and by 1969 were housing 50,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops. Each base was a self-contained logistics base and could carry out transportation, engineer, medical, maintenance, storage, and security functions.

In an article in the New York Times, C.L. Sulzberger described the importance of the Cambodian sanctuaries to the North Vietnamese:

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces would have been unable to bear their losses were it not for the sanctuaries. Without Cambodia as an ordnance depot, training center, and transportation route for materiel, men, medicine, and food, the Communists in South Vietnam could not possibly last out the year.

We will not discuss the military aspects of the war in any depth. There are numerous books written by military historians that tell that story. We will endeavor to give a brief review of Cambodia and its unwilling involvement in the war and review some of the military actions that took place. Our main priority will be to show the psychological operations that went on as the Americans and South Vietnamese tried to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to convince the North Vietnamese and Cambodian troops and civilians to quit the war.

During the 1950s and 1960s, neutrality was the central element of Cambodian foreign policy. All of the local powers had signed a pact guaranteeing that neutrality. Nobody intended to honor that pact. With the escalation of the Vietnam War, some of Cambodia’s eastern provinces were occupied by the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces operating against South Vietnam. By 1969, as enemy activity grew, the United States opted to bomb the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong bases inside Cambodia.

American troop operations in Cambodia, codenamed “Daniel Boone,” began in 1967. The teams included South Vietnamese troops led by American Special Forces personnel. The men assigned these missions wore very plain military uniforms without American markings and carried neutralized weapons that were untraceable. They crossed the border on foot or in unmarked Air Force helicopters. Hundreds of teams were sent across the border to Cambodia in 1968. “Daniel Boone” was later replaced by “Salem House” as a codename for Cambodia operations. The final codename for Cambodia was “Thot Not,” referring to a type of Mangrove tree that grows there. It should be noted that during the 1960s, leaflets were used extensively throughout Indochina. Examples are Operation Trail, a leaflet program against North Vietnamese troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail; the Royal Lao Air Force Operation Fountain Pen, directed against North Vietnamese troops in Laos, and Operation Rice River, against North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.

In March 1970, Gen. Lon Nol overthrew the neutral Prince Sihanouk and assumed power. The Cambodian monarchy was eliminated, and the pro-western leader renamed his nation the Khmer Republic. It became clear in April 1970 that North Vietnam was invading Cambodia. Three of Cambodia’s 17 provinces were occupied and five others were under heavy pressure. The Cambodians appealed to the Free World for aide against the invading North Vietnamese. The United States tried to quietly help the new government. On 17 April it sent 6,000 captured AK-47 rifles to Phnom Penh. The South Vietnamese also sent over 3,000 Civilian Irregular Defense Group troops of Khmer origin to Phnom Penh to support the new Khmer Army. The new government requested the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Instead, the Vietnamese increased their forces and returned several thousand Cambodians that had gone to North Vietnam in 1954. They became the Khmer Rouge (Red Khymer), trained and armed by the North Vietnamese. They would become infamous at the end of the war for murdering about 1.5 million of their own people by execution, starvation and forced labor.

This escalation of Communist forces probably led directly to the major Allied incursion into Cambodia in April 1970.

On 30 April 1970 Richard Nixon announced that six thousand Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops, supported by U.S. advisors, artillery, and fighter bombers had invaded Cambodia. He said in part;

Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters of the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia’s neutrality.

Carolyn Page mentions Nixon’s Cambodia fixation in U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973, Leicester University Press, London, 1996. She quotes Henry Kissinger:

These recommendations [from General Abrams in Saigon requesting permission on 9 February 1969 to bomb the bases in Cambodia, a request seconded by U.S. Ambassador Bunker in Saigon] fell on fertile ground. In the transition period of 8 January 1969, the President-elect had sent me a note: “In making your study of Vietnam I want a precise report on what the enemy is doing in Cambodia, and what, if anything, we are doing to destroy the buildup there. I think a very definite change of policy toward Cambodia probably should be one of our first orders of business when we get in.

The Communists had forecast just such a possible attack. A captured July 1969 Viet Cong “battle plan” is mentioned by Larry Berman in Perfect Spy, Smithsonian Books, 2007:

If our attacks in all aspects are not sufficiently strong and if the Americans are able to temporarily overcome part of their difficulties, they will strive to prolong the war in South Vietnam…and carry out the de-Americanization in a prolonged war contest before they admit defeat and accept a political solution…in the case of a prolonged de-escalation, the Americans may…put pressure on us by threatening to broaden the war by expanding it into Cambodia.

The South Vietnamese-American incursion into Cambodia was grouped into three main attacks each with its own code-name. The Vietnamese deployed more troops than the U.S. did, and probably as a result the code names were all in Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese II Corps and U.S. Field Force I attack was code-named Binh Tay (Tame the West).

The Vietnamese III Corps and U.S. Field Force II attack was code-named Toan Thang (Total Victory).

The Vietnamese IV Corps and U.S Delta Military Assistance Command advance was code-named Cuu Long (Mekong).

The American – South Vietnamese attacks were all along the Cambodian border so the enemy had a difficult time determining which advance was the major thrust. The primary allied assaults came in the center, and were aimed at the alleged locations of large supply bases and depots as well as the suspected location of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the headquarters that was believed to be running the war in the south. On 1 May 1970, B-52 bombers were used and ARVN airborne battalions air-assaulted behind enemy lines in an attempt to cut off the North Vietnamese retreat. At the same time, the American “Task Force Shoemaker” moved in from the south. The Americans found a major base that had belonged to the North Vietnamese 7th Division that contained over five hundred structures, including storage houses, barracks, a hospital, and mess halls. The Americans captured over 200 tons of weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives, and rice. On 6 May the American discovered another enormous supply depot. This one held over 300 tons of supplies and weapons, including Soviet-made artillery shells and trucks. On 23 May, the Americans found another large depot consisting of 59 buried bunkers filled with weapons and ammunition.

The North Vietnamese Army withdrew deeper into Cambodia. Altogether, the two months of incursions involved roughly 60,000 South Vietnamese and 50,000 American troops. The Allies probably killed at least 10,000 North Vietnamese Army troops and Viet Cong. It is estimated that they captured or destroyed tens of thousands of weapons, 1,800 tons of ammunition, over 8,000 tons of rice, and over a million pages of documents.

Along with the military actions, the Allies used psychological operations (PSYOP). American aircraft dropped leaflets over Cambodia to inform communist troops that their sanctuaries were being attacked by a combined Vietnamese-American force. Other leaflets warned the communists to save themselves from the onslaught by surrendering. The United States was victorious on a small scale and seized Communist documents and supplies, but they did not break the back of the opposition, which simply moved deeper into Cambodia.

It was not only the United States that practiced psychological operations in Cambodia. The new Khmer Republic also produced some leaflets and posters. Shadow War author Ken Conboy adds some thoughts on PSYOP operations in the Khmer Republic. He sends notes taken from the U.S. Defense Attaché’s monthly assessment reports:

The Khmer National Armed Forces Force Armée Nationale Khmère (FANK) PSYOP campaign formally began in November 1972 with the formation of a Political Warfare Directorate within the General Staff. It provided administration for a political warfare brigade to be formed as the executive agent for FANK PSYOP operations.

In November 1972, President of the Khmer Republic Lon Nol appointed his people to positions in the Liberation and National Building Directorate (LEN). He appointed Colonel Thach Reng as LEN “Chief of Staff.” Besides this full-time assignment, Reng was the commander of the Khmer Special Forces. It is believed that LEN had a PSYOP component.

In December 1972, US government aircraft dropped 35 million copies of “Rally to the National Government” leaflets. This was the first use of U.S. aircraft in support of PSYOP efforts for FANK. The U.S. also dropped 300,000 copies of FANK Commander Sosthene Fernandez’s “First Order of the Day,” and 100,000 copies of Lon Nol’s ideas. All printing was done by the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa.

The codename for Allied PSYOP booklets prepared and disseminated in Cambodia was “Soap Chips.”

The declassified secret 1974 report Cambodian Psychological Study mentions some of the propaganda produced by both the National Government and the Communist insurgents. It discusses Sihanouk and points out that he decided early that the North Vietnamese would win and therefore ignored their presence, hoping that if he allowed the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to use his eastern border areas, the rest of the nation would be left in peace. As British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain discovered in 1938, appeasement does not work against a dedicated aggressor. The report also indicated that Sihanouk was a skillful propagandist and provided a façade of legitimacy to the Communist activities in Cambodia. The Communists regularly used his name to gain the support of the people.

The report states that the Cambodian Government PSYOP efforts were disorganized. The Force Armée Nationale Khmère dropped leaflets but kept no records. Leaflets and posters were printed by the Ministry of Information and propaganda teams were sent into the countryside by the Ministry of Community Development. There were attempts to coordinate these various programs, but they never came to fruition.

The government did have one C-47 aerial loudspeaker-equipped aircraft that was also used to disseminate aerial propaganda leaflets. The South Vietnamese Air Force would sometimes provide aircraft for leaflet dropping when requested. The government also had eight truck-mounted loudspeakers. They were used to make public announcements and rally public support for the government.

The Communist Khmer Rouge also used psychological operations. Five Communist radio stations broadcast in the Cambodian language; Radio Peking, Radio Moscow, Hanoi International, Liberation Radio and the Voice of the Front of Kampuchea.

The Communists also prepared leaflets. They were aimed at both Communist and Government-controlled areas. The former indoctrinated Cambodians in the history of the struggle for freedom, liberty from U.S. imperialism, and class struggle. The propaganda for the government areas included warning on imminent attacks, calls to evacuate to the “liberated” areas, inciting government and military leaders to defect, inciting workers to strike for better wages and working conditions and encouraging criticism of the National Government.

The communists also made great use of face-to-face communications. They used propaganda teams and in some cases intellectuals who had joined the cause, doctors, teachers, Buddhist monks and former government officials.

When one reads the various secret documents prepared during and after the Cambodian Incursion it is interesting to note how little they actually say. An example is the classified secret 26 November 1971 United States Senate Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations – Assistance to the Khmer Republic (Cambodia).

This senate study of activities in Cambodia notes that about $520,000 in U.S. funds were identified as being spent on psychological operations, but nobody is sure of the exact amount. The money was spent by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Embassy Thailand and the 7th PSYOP Group - Okinawa and Thailand. The money was appropriated by the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the Agency for International Development (AID).

About $200,000 went to purchase 67,000 pocket-size battery-operated radios to be distributed in rural areas. The 7th PSYOP Group billed about $250,000 for printing support to Cambodia. Both of these payments were from the Pacific Command Psychological Operations Fund. The United States gave about $70,000 to radio Cambodia, mostly parts and equipment. It also loaned a 10 kilowatt portable transmitter to improve the medium wave signal.

Even more interesting, the Central Intelligence Agency representative stated that he had just four to six persons in Cambodia and they only gathered information. The CIA “was not training, and had not in the past trained, any police or paramilitary personnel for Cambodia…” The U.S. Ambassador told the Senate that he was satisfied that the CIA were only gathering information in Cambodia.

By coincidence, I recently spoke to a friend who claimed to have jumped into Cambodia. He said that there were about five teams of American troops from mixed services, each made up of five men, all in sanitized uniforms. His 0300 mission was to remove a village leader and get out quickly by helicopter extraction. He thought now that he was probably working for the CIA, but he was not sure. It sounds more like SOG. The strangest thing was that he claims he was told that before they selected him that they went back to his basic training days and discovered that he had 62 out of 63 hits on target at the rifle range. They wanted an airborne qualified trooper who was also an expert rifleman. His story of a jump into Cambodia seemed rather strange but further research indicated that the United States recognizes (quietly) 13 separate static line jumps over North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia under operations Eldest Son, Italian Green and Pole Bean. The missions are unknown but listed with a question mark as “to sabotage enemy ammunition supply?”

Meanwhile, the new Khmer Republic’s leadership was plagued by a lack of unity and corruption. They were unable to transform their small 30,000-man army into a national combat force of more than 200,000 men. The insurgency grew stronger as Pol Pot took control and became known as a Communist leader who was both tough and merciless. The Khmer Rouge forces became stronger and more independent of their Vietnamese patrons. By 1974, they controlled all but small enclaves around the cities and main transportation routes.

On 1 January 1975, communist troops launched an offensive that, in 117 days defeated the Khmer Republic. The United States promised help, but just as in Vietnam the Congress refused additional aid for Cambodia so the airlift of ammunition and never got off the ground. Phnom Penh surrendered on 17 April 1975. The “Domino Theory” became real as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia all fell to the Communists.

The leafleting of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia was a secret campaign known as Operation Camel Path, The declassified top secret report MACVSOG Command History, Volume II, 1967 reported that during late 1966 and 1967, the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) conducted an intensive PSYWAR campaign against North Vietnamese army troops located along the Cambodian border with South Vietnam.

In late November 1967, MACV established Operation Camel Path. The mission was to conduct leaflet operations against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and routes of infiltration into the Republic of Vietnam. The Commander, 7th Air Force was tasked with the responsibility of carrying out the leaflet drops.

In an effort to minimize violation of Cambodian air space, MACV first used the wind drift method of leaflet dissemination, whereby aircraft flew along the border and used favorable wind currents to carry leaflets 15-20 kilometers inside Cambodia. This method proved to be unreliable because it required the winds to be moving in a specific direction at a specific speed. In March 1967 permission was given for Cambodian over-flights, to be accomplished by cargo aircraft at night at an altitude of from 6,000 to 10,000 feet. Four sorties a week were authorized. Leaflets were to be in the Vietnamese language and use all the themes mentioned during the “Trail Campaign” against troops coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to fight in South Vietnam.

Strangely, Cambodian language leaflets would not be prepared since it was feared that King Sihanouk might use them to complain that the Allies were meddling in Cambodian internal affairs. Nobody wanted to drive Sihanouk further into the Communist camp. We will depict some Cambodian language leaflets near the end of this article to show that they were prepared later in the war.

A three-month and six-month evaluation of the program indicated no increase in defection rates among the NVA troops moving south. However, those troops that did defect said that the leaflets were an influencing factor.

U.S. leaflet drops from Cambodian air space were never officially acknowledged. In fact, the Secretary of Defense forwarded the following guidance:

Under no circumstances will anyone having knowledge about these operations acknowledge that leaflets are being dropped over Cambodia. Public comments on this subject whether on background, off the record, or any other basis are prohibited. Following line, not to be volunteered, should be used in Saigon (and will be followed in Washington) in answering any press queries on a background basis: "We have for sometime been dropping leaflets in South Vietnamese border areas, Given wind drift, we assume some of these leaflets have been falling inside Cambodia." It goes on to say: "In the event of incidents involving loss of US personnel or aircraft...spokesman may acknowledge possibility of inadvertent entry into Cambodia air space by elements operating in SVN as a result of navigational error.

To give an example of the way the leaflets were prepared and dropped I note from a leaflet order sent to the 7th group for a mix of six Camel Path leaflets ordered in November 1967 for dissemination in January 1968. The leaflets are CP-02, 08A, 09, 10, 55A, and 1389A. All are black and white and sized 3 x 6-inches. 5 million of each was ordered. They would be placed in a mix and dropped together. The leaflets were forwarded to the respective PSYOP stationed in the I, II and III Corps areas. 15,000,000 were for 245th PSYOP Company in Pleiku, 10,000,000 for the 246th PSYOP Company in Bien Hoa and 5,000,000 for 19th PSYOP Company Can Tho.

I might also mention an after-action report of the 4th Division dated 21 July 1970 that states in regard to the Cambodian incursion:

Psychological operations were initially geared toward the exploitation of Hoi Chanh, supply and weapons caches, and significant victories. When the number of enemy personnel in the area proved to be limited, enough to lessen the possibility of Hoi Chanhs and major tactical victories, propaganda efforts were shifted toward the exploitation of discovered supply and weapons caches. Leaflets were also developed to inform the civilian populace of the purpose of the operation and to tell them how to protect themselves. A total of 4,320,000, leaflets were dropped in Base Area 702 during the conduct of the operation. 180,000 of those leaflets were directed at the civilian population. <>

Reference: http://www.psywarrior.com/CambodiaPsyop.html